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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction
pursuant

to

is conferred

Sec.

on the Utah Court of Appeals

78-2a-3(2) (d),

U.C.A.

(1988,

Supp),

Sec.

77-35-26(4)(a) U.C.A. (1988, Supp) and Rule 26, Code of Criminal
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from his conviction by jury of negligent
homicide

in the

Second

Circuit Court, State of Utah, Davis

County, Layton Department.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:

1.

Did the Court err when it held that the State's medical

expert witnesses were qualified to state the medical standard of
care applicable to the delivery and immediate care thereafter of
an infant in a home birth setting?

2.

Did the Court err when it held that the State was not

required to present expert medical evidence as to the degree
Defendant's conduct allegedly deviated from the medical standard
of care?

3. Was there sufficient evidence establishing a causal link
between Defendant's alleged misconduct and the death of the
infant child so as to support the jury's finding that Defendant
was guilty of negligent homicide.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of this case.
During

the

late

evening

hours

of

November

7,

1986,

Defendant, who is a physician licensed by the State of Utah,
attended the delivery of a male infant at the home of his mother
and grandmother in Kaysville, Davis County, Utah.

Following birth, and after assessing the well-being of the
child. Defendant left the infant in the care of his mother and
grandmother.

Approximately 12i hours following birth, the child

died.

Defendant was later charged and convicted of the crime of
negligent homicide in connection with the death of the child.

It

is that conviction from which Defendant now appeals.

B.

Course of proceedings.
Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning November 16,

1987.

However, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18,

1987, due to improper testimony given by one of the State's
witnesses (R. at page 3).

Defendant was again tried by jury beginning February 22,
1988,

which

continued

through

February

26,

1988.

He

was

convicted of the offense charged (R. at page 7).

On March
Judgment

11, 1988, Defendant

filed

(R. at pages 73 through 133).

a Motion

to Arrest

The Motion was heard

April 7, 1988 (R. at page 7). The Court denied the Motion in a
written decision dated June 23, 1988 (R. at pages 154 through
159) .

Defendant was sentenced August 10, 1988, (R. at page 8)
following which he filed a Motion for a New Trial and In the
Alternative a Petition to Stay Execution of Sentence Pending
Appeal and for Issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause (R. at
pages 161 through 174).

Counsel agreed that the Court rule on those matters without
argument.

The ruling was in written form dated September 19,

1988 (R. at pages 181 through 182) . The Motion for a New Trial
was denied but the Petition to Stay Execution of Sentence and
Issue a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted (R. at page 9).

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on September 30, 1988.
(R. at page 185).

C.

Disposition at Trial Court.
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See subparagraph B above.
D.

Statement of facts.
Defendant

University

of

internship

was

is

a

physician

Pennsylvania
at

Madigan

having

Medical
General

graduated

School

in

Hospital,

Washington (T. Vol. IV, page 40, lines 8 - 20).

from
1964.

Fort

the
His

Lewis,

After four years

in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County,
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20).

He was Board certified in

family medicine in 1970 and has been until the present time (Id.
at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1 - 13).

During his practice, Defendant attended approximately 2500
deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id^ at page 45,
lines 9 - 25) .

A home delivery patient must be low risk,

hospital facilities should be near in case of emergency and there
must

be

family

support

for

the mother

and

child

following

delivery (I<3. at page 48, lines 1 - 2 5 ; page 49, lines 1 - 2 3 ;
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11).

The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young.

She lived

in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice and Ivy Young, who
are from England having arrived in the United States in 1985 (T.
Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7). Maurice and Ivy
are the parents of seven children (Joanne being number 5) all of

whom were born in England.

Four were home deliveries

(Id. at

page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3).

Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986.

She

thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page 40,
lines

10

-

15) .

She

Thereafter, Joanne and

told

her

parents

in

early

summer.

Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who

specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in
Layton, Utah (Id., at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18).

They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and again
August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174, line 4
and page

176, lines 15 - 18).

A complete OB exam was not

performed on the first visit because there was a question about
payment (Ij3. at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 19 22) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for
his daughter

(Id. at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8).

Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at
which

time a complete OB exam was done.

Her pregnancy was

determined to be normal (low risk) (Id. at page 226, lines 16 page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4

and T. Vol.

IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986.

However, Dr.

Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because
he was uncertain
line 12).

(T. Vol. II at page 219, line 12 - page 220,

Joanne never returned

for the test.

She and her

family were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T.
- 8 -

Vol, III, page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page
149, line 21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 page 342, line 5).

Joanne

and

Ivy

decided

on

a

home

delivery

and

asked

Defendant to attend (T. Vol. Ill, page 49, lines 4 - 15). They
visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 -20).
Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery.

He

found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the
birth of her child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line
19) .

Defendant

confirmed

the date of delivery

to be early

December, 1986 (If3. at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9). He
saw her again October 6, 1986.

The exam did not change his prior

assessment (3J3. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12).

On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at the
University of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High School
Football Team as its team physician where they were participating
in the State Tournament.

He was contacted by Ivy through his

remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened with some
vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting (T. Vol. IV, page 67, line
7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4 - page 106,
line 18) .

Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that labor was

beginning early.

Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne down and

call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation worsened (T.
Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 2 3 ; Vol. IV, page 69, line 7 - page
71, line 5).

Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant that
the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of the
child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier
which would make Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line 7 page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110, line
20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id., at
page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3). Defendant advised Ivy to
call again around 5:00 p.m. if Joanne appeared to be continuing
with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 1 9 ) .

Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that Joanne
was having occasional contractions.

He instructed her to call

when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T. Vol.
IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at page
65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol. II, page 25, line 7 line 23).

Ivy called Defendant at home about 10:15 p.m. and advised
that Joanne was in the last stages of labor.

Defendant arrived

at the Young residence at 10:30 p.m. (T. Vol. I, page 67, line 2
- page 68, line 18) .

Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m.
breach position
difficulty.

The child presented in a

and was delivered within one minute without

There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was

the

amniotic

fluid

tinged

with

blood.

The

child

breathed

spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five
minute APGAR score of 8 which indicated that the child had good
potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17 page 86, line 5).

The child was small.
being between 4 - 5

pounds.

Defendant estimated his weight as
Defendant thought it was premature

(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 1 8 ) .

Following

birth,

the

child

exhibited

some

symptoms

of

grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning
the child.
was

Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization

indicated.

Defendant

She

thereupon

expressed
showed

concern

Joanne

how

about
to

the

nurse

expense.

the

child,

instructed her on how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that
she

must

watch

the

child

during

the

night

regarding

his

temperature, color and respiration^ and if they worsened to call
him.

Ivy acknowledged the instructions and Defendant left the

home at about 11:30 p.m.

(Id. at paq j 96, line 13 through page

105, line 4; Vol. 1, page 85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122,
line 12 - page 130, line 11).

Defendant did not hear from the family until the next day
about noon when he called the home and was advised the child had
died.

(Id. at page 111, line 7 - page 113, line 5).

During

the night, Ivy moved

Joanne

another bedroom where it was warmer.

and the child into

On two occasions, she

observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which
concerned her.
held him.

About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne

He still appeared blue.

They wrapped him in a quilt.

At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing.
observed the condition and resusitated him.
Joanne to be aware of the situation.

Ivy

She did not want

Ivy worked with the child

for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol.
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 1 2 ) .

Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about 8:30
a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small.
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized.
were trying to get the doctor.

Ivy said they

Ivy did not disclose to Iris that

the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier
nor that there was any emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15 page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2).

Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. but
he was not in.

She did not identify herself or report any

emergency concerning the child.

She also called Defendant's home

but he was not there.

Again, she did not identify herself or

report any emergency.

(T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97,

line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11).
- 12 -

During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact
Defendant, did not call the paramedics and did not take the child
to

the

hospital

notwithstanding

the

child's

deteriorating

condition (T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11).
Rather, she called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not
advise him of any emergency.

The Bishop contacted Frank Kramer,

M.D., a pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page
38, line 2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page
261, line 25).

The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m.
child appeared lifeless.

The

He was rushed to Humana North Davis

Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m.
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1 page 268, line 9).

A

post-mortum

examination

indicated

the

child

died

of

respiratory distress syndrome (R. at pages 69 - 71).

Defendant was available by telephone during the night of
November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant makes

three

arguments

appeal:

- 13 -

in

connection

with

his

1.

The State called expert medical witnesses to prove the

applicable standard of medical care in a home delivery setting.
However, none

of

those witnesses

had

ever

attended

a home

delivery, did not teach home delivery medical standards of care
and were philosophically opposed to home deliveries.
circumstances, the witnesses

were

of

a different

Under the
school of

medicine than Defendant relative to home deliveries and thus were
not qualified to testify as to the applicable medical standard of
care.

2.
testify

Assuming that the State's witnesses were qualified to
as

to

the

applicable

medical

standard

of

care,

nevertheless, the State failed in its proof against Defendant
because

there

was

no

testimony

presented

as

Defendant's conduct deviated from the standard.
constitutes civil negligence.

to

the

degree

A mere deviation

Criminal negligence necessitates a

gross deviation giving rise to a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that death will occur.

Since this is a criminal case

arising out of a medical context, there must be expert medical
testimony as to whether a deviation occurred and as to the degree
of the deviation.

There was no such testimony presented during

trial.

3.

Negligent homicide requires testimony establishing a

causal link between Defendant's alleged criminal negligence and
the death of the child.

In this case, there is insufficient

evidence to establish that link beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 14 -

As a result of the three foregoing arguments, the State
failed in its proof against Defendant entitling Defendant to a
reversal of his conviction.

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide, a Class A
Misdemeanor.

The applicable

statute defining the offense is

U.C.A. §76-5-206(1) (1953 replacement), which states:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes
the death of another.
Criminal

negligence

is defined

in U.C.A.

§76-2-103(4)

(1953

replacement), as follows:
A person engages in conduct: . . .
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and justifiable
risk that the circumstances exist of the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Based on the foregoing, the State had the burden of proving
the following elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

1.

That

Defendant's

conduct

which;

- 15 -

resulted

in

circumstances

2.

Created an unreasonable and unjustifiable risk;

3.

Constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care

which;

4.

Caused the death of the infant child.

Since the factual context of this case involves medical care
rendered by a physician
necessary

that

expert

in a home delivery
medical

testimony

setting, it was
be

presented

to

establish:

1.

The applicable medical standard;

2.

That Defendant's conduct was a gross deviation from the

standard; and

3.

That the alleged breach caused the death of the child.

Defendant's arguments deal with each point separately.

POINT I
THE STATE'S MEDICAL EXPERTS WERE NOT QUALIFIED
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE APPLICABLE MEDICAL STANDARD
BECAUSE THEY WERE OF A DIFFERENT SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE THAN DEFENDANT.
A.

A medical standard of care must be determined by expert

medical testimony.

- 16 -

In Marsh v. Pembertonf 10 Utah 2d, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), the
Utah Supreme Court held that:
The ordinary care and skill required of a doctor in a
community in which he serves must necessarily be
established by expert testimony.
347 P.2d at 110.

See also Forrow v. Health Services, 604 P.2d 474, 477 - 478
(Utah, 1979); Chadwick v. Nielsen, M.D., 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) and Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740
P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

The rule is the same whether the standard of medical care
arises in a civil or criminal case.

In State v. Hodgdon, 416

P.2d 647 (Ore 1966), the Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2,
commenting on the definition of "gross negligence" in a negligent
homicide case, explained:
The term . . . is the same when applied to civil law
as when used to define and ingredient of a crime.
416 P.2d at 649.

See also State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 235, 239

(Utah 1980).

B.

Moreover, the expert must be of the same school of medicine

to render an opinion as to a particular medical standard of care
as the school of medicine practiced by the person against whom
the standard is to be applied.

Utah adheres to the rule that a medical standard of care can
only be established by an expert witness of the same school of
medicine as the school in which the standard is sought to be
applied.

In Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court held:
It is true that, ordinarily a practitioner of one
school of medicine is not competent to testify as an
expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner
of another school. In light of the wide variation
between schools in both precepts and practices, as a
general matter, this rule makes good sense. It has
been adopted in a majority of states and we follow it
here. (Emphasis added).
711 P.2d at 248.

There is, however, an exception to the general rule:
. . . an expert witness belonging to one school may
competently testify against a member of another
school once sufficient foundation has been laid to
show that the method of treatment - and hence the
standard of care - is common to both schools.
Id.

Our case is unusual in this regard because the standard of
care must be of the

school of medicine

involving

a

family

practitioner managing labor, delivery and neonate care in the
context of a home birth setting.

- 1ft
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C.

The State's expert witnesses were not of the same school of

medicine as Defendant and were therefore incompetent to testify
as to the applicable medical standard.

The State called several expert medical witnesses, none of
whom were of the same school of medicine as Defendant.

1.

Mark

Bitner,

M.D.:

Dr.

obstetrician who cared for Joanne.

Bitner

was

the

first

He specializes in obstetrical

medicine (T. Vol. IIf page 173, lines 11 - 13). He was asked to
comment on the standard of care relating to the management of
Joanne's labor in her home birth setting.

On the issue as to whether Defendant should have removed
Joanne from her home to a hospital for ultrasound evaluation
after evidence of bleeding on the day of delivery. Dr. Bitner
acknowledged he didn't know how to answer the question because he
doesn't do home births and is biased against them (Id. at page
196, lines 6 - 22? page 217, lines 15 -25).

Nevertheless, over
elicit

testimony

standard of care

that

objection, the
Defendant

(home birth

was

setting)

State was
outside

the

allowed

to

applicable

in not assessing the

bleeding condition in a hospital as opposed to the conservative
approach of Defendant in waiting and watching (£d. at page 205,
line 25 - page 210, line 9).

- 19 -

Notwithstanding

his

opinion,

on

cross-examination.

Dr.

Bitner acknowledged several differences between hospital and home
birth deliveries (Id. at page 214, line 10 - page 217, line 14);
that medicine is the art of exercising medical judgment based
upon experience and expertise (Id. at page 233, line 16 - page
236, line 18); that Defendant's judgment as to the implication of
Joanne's bleeding proved correct (jld. at page 234, line 19 - page
241, line 8); and that Defendant is a competent physician (Id. at
page 230 lines 15 - 25).

Under the circumstances, the jury was placed in the position
of determining whether Dr. Bitner's opinion that Defendant was
outside the standard of care was correct or his contrary opinion
on cross-examination that Defendant's judgment and management of
Joanne's

labor

was

medically

sound.

It

was

prejudice

to

Defendant for that conflict to exist in that Dr. Bitner should
not have been allowed to express his opinion on the issue in the
first instance in that he was of a different school of medicine
than Defendant.

Moreover, there was no testimony presented that

the treatment rendered by Defendant in the home birth setting
would be the same as the treatment rendered by Dr. Bitner who
does not do home deliveries.

Consequently, the exception to the

general rule does not apply.

2.

Branch Ware, M.D.;

Dr. Ware

is a Board

certified

obstetrician on the staff at the University of Utah Medical
Center (T. Vol. Ill, page 155, lines 13 - 16), who doesn't attend
- 20 -

home

deliveries, doesn't

recommend home deliveries.

Nevertheless, over

teach

home

deliveries

and

doesn't

(Ic[. at page 223, line 24 - line 15).

objection.

Dr. Ware

was

allowed

to

testify concerning standards of care applicable in a home birth
setting concerning vaginal bleeding of the patient and care of
the newborn.

3.

(Id. at page 158, line 18 - page 198, line 35).

Frank D. Kramer, M.D.:

Dr. Kramer is a Board certified

pediatrician (T. Vol. II, page 260, lines 8 - 15).

He was called

and asked to go to the Young residence by their Bishop (Id. at
page 260, line 12 - page 261, line 12).

During Dr. Kramer's testimony, he expressed the opinion that
the child should have been immediately hospitalized (Icl. at page
276, lines 4 - 9 ) . He felt that home births are risky because of
the need to repose confidence in the family after delivery to
watch the child.

His opinion was premised upon philosophical

principles and not home birth standards (Id^. at page 292, line 23
- page 303, line 2). Therefore, his testimony was also based
upon a different school of medicine than that of Defendant.

4.

Gary Chan, M.D.:

Dr. Chan is Chief Neonatologist -

Pediatrician at the University of Utah Hospital - Medical School
in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. Vol. Ill, page 238, line 7 - 9 ) . He
does not attend home deliveries.

The practice is not taught at

the medical school where he teaches (Id. at page 266, line 17 - 21 -

page 277, line 16), He is reluctant to vest confidence in the
family to observe the newborn (3J3. at page 269, line 10 - page
270, line 9) and acknowledges that the key in home delivery is
whether the family is able to recognize changes in the child
during the immediate observation period following birth.

He too

is therefore of a school of medicine different than that of
Defendant.

The

only

witness

called

who

was

qualified

to

testify

concerning the medical standard of care applicable to labor and
delivery in a home birth setting was Dr. Gregory White who was
called by Defendant.

He is a family physician who practices home

deliveries and is a member of the American College of Home
Obstetrics.

(T. Vol. IV, page 234, line 12 - page 289, line 25).

At no time during his entire testimony did Dr. White indicate
that Defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care (Id.
at page 234 - page 290).

Since the State's experts were not of the same school of
medicine as Defendant, the State failed in its proof as to the
proper medical standard of care entitling Defendant to a reversal
of his conviction.

POINT II
THERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE RECORD AS TO THE
DEGREE OF DEVIATION FROM THE APPLICABLE STANDARD
OF CARE.

"Criminal negligence" requires a mens rea defined
"gross deviation from the standard of care."

as a

U.C.A. §76-2-103(4)

(1988 Supp.).

In medical cases, the standard of care must be established
by qualified expert medical testimony because "the nature of the
profession removes the particulars of

its practice

knowledge and understanding of the average citizen."
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980).

from the
Nixdorf v.

Moreover, the physician's

failure to meet the standard of care must also be established by
expert

medical

testimony.

The

Court

in

Nixdorf

states

as

follows:
[B]efore the Plaintiff can prevail in a medical
malpractice action, he must establish both the
standard of care required of the Defendant as a
practicing physician in the community and the
Defendant's
failure
to employ
that
standard.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 351, See also Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980).

This principle is adhered to by other jurisdictions. In
Miller v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, (Col Ct. App. 1980) the
Court held that it is:
. . . incumbent upon the Plaintiff (prosecution) to
prove by expert testimony that Defendant departed
from the standard of care required from Defendant as
a physician. (Emphasis added)
628 P.2d at 245.

In Harvey v. Kellin, 566 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1977), the Court
held:
- 21 -

[A] general practitioner in treating a patient must
use the degree of skill and learning exercised by
general practitioners in the same or similar
community. The standard must be shown by affirmative
evidence and a deviation from it must be established
by expert medical testimony. (Emphasis added)
566 P.2d at 300.

See also Baylor v. Jacobsen, 552 P.2d 55, 58 (Mont. 1976).

("the

standard of care to which a medical practitioner is held and the
breach

thereof

must

be

established

by

expert

medical

testimony.").

Although

the

State

establishing

what

standard

care, it utterly

of

establishing

it

offered

believed

to

evidence
be

failed

the
to

in

this

requisite
offer

any

case

medical
evidence

the degree of deviation therefrom by Defendant.

There is testimony

in the record

in which a State's expert

witness said Defendant's conduct was outside the standard of care
but never did the State present evidence as to the "degree of the
deviation."

A

mere

deviation

from

the

standard

is

civil

negligence only - not criminal negligence, which requires a gross
deviation giving rise to a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that death will occur.

No such testimony was presented at trial.

Defendant moved for a non-suit at the conclusion of the
State's case, one of the reasons being that there was no evidence
as to the degree of deviation from the standard of care.

The

Court denied the motion (T. Vol. Ill, page 283, line 14 - page
305, line 22). The same issue was raised in Defendant's Motion
- 24 -

to Arrest Judgment which was also denied (R. page 75 - 134 and
154 - 159).

Both denials were error justifying this Court's

reversal of Defendant's conviction in the Court below.

POINT III
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT'S ACTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BIRTH AND THE IMMEDIATE CARE
OF THE CHILD AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DEATH.
For one to be convicted of negligent homicide, it must be
proven

beyond

deviation"
another.

a

from

reasonable
the

U.C.A.

replacement).

standard

doubt

that

of care

§76-5-206(1)

and

the

"caused

alleged

"gross

the death" of

§76-2-103(4)

(1953

In the case at bar, there is insufficient evidence

to establish that causal link.

This Court " . . .

may review the verdict of a jury in a

criminal case and reverse as a matter of lav; if (the Court)
find[s] the evidence is insufficient" (State v. Harmon, 99 Utah
Adv. Rep. 34, 35, Utah Court of Appeals, January 10, 1989).
also State v. Cantee, 750 P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988).

However as

this Court stated, the standard for reversal is high:
We reverse . . . only when the evidence . . . is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have determined a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the
crime.
Id. at page 35.

See also State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
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See

In the case at bar, the State alleged that Defendant's
conduct was outside the medical standard of care thus giving rise
to certain unreasonable and unjustifiable risks which caused the
death of the child.

A.

Those risks are stated as follows:

Vaginal bleeding;

The State elicited expert testimony from Dr.s Bitner and
Branch that vaginal bleeding on the day of delivery gave rise to
a potentially serious problem
necessitating

(placenta previa, obrupto, etc.)

hospital evaluation.

Since Defendant

responded

with conservative care (watch and wait) as opposed to requiring
Joanne to be admitted to a hospital, the State contended he was
outside the applicable standard of care (T. Vol. II, page 172 page 259; Vol. Ill, page 155 - page 233).

However, the testimony of the doctors make it clear that the
bleeding did not result in a placental accident (T. Vol. II, page
240, line 19 - page 241, line 8; Vol. Ill, page 203, line 13 page 205, line 2 ) , did not injure the child nor result in its
death.

Consequently,

there

is

no

causal

link

between

the

bleeding and the deviation from the alleged medical standard.

B.

Leaving the child with Ivy and Joanne following its birth

without insisting upon hospitalization:

_ oc __

The state also elicited expert testimony from Dr.s Kramer
and Chan that it was outside the standard of care for Defendant
to leave the child with his grandmother and mother following
birth when he was premature

and had manifested

symptoms of

possible respiratory distress (T. Vol. II, page 259, line 23 page 282, line 24, Vol. Ill, page 234, line 5 - page 257, line 5)
even though there was a 98% chance that the child would not
require medical intervention (^d.

at page 257, line 19 - page

261, line 6) .

Nevertheless, Dr. Kramer testified that the child's life
might have been spared had he received medical attention up to
eleven hours after birth (T. Vol. II, page 290, line 18 - page
292, line 14) and Dr. Chan testified that his life may have been
spared had he received medical attention up to twelve hours after
birth (T. Vol. Ill, page 264, line 7 - page 266, line 2).

Since

the child was born at 10:40 p.m., his life may have been spared
had he received medical attention as late as 9:40 to 10:40 a.m.
the next morning.

The

issue

thus

becomes whether

the

child

died

because

Defendant left him with the grandmother and mother to observe
during the night or because Ivy failed to advise Defendant or
others of the child's worsening condition which she observed
throughout the night and during the early morning hours of the
following day.

Defendant assessed Ivy Young as being capable of observing
the child immediately following birth.

She was the mother of

seven, four of whom were born at home (T. Vol. IV, page 52, line
8 - page 55, line 1). Following delivery he advised her of a
possible respiratory problem and told her that the child must be
observed during the night regarding its temperature, color and
respirations and to call if the child worsened (Icl. at page 96,
line 13 - page 102, line 2). Ivy acknowledged that Dr. Warden
asked her to observe the child during the night (T. Vol. II, page
46, lines 19 - 22) although she denied he told her what to watch
for (T. Vol. I, page 85, lines 22 - 23). Nevertheless, she knew
that the body temperature of a newborn is important to its health
(T. Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - 20) and that it was a very
serious emergency if the child had difficulty breathing (^d.. at
page 65, line 18 - page 68, line 11). Indeed, during the night,
she did observe the extremities of the child becoming more blue
(Id. at page 54, lines 14 - 19). She also observed the child's
labored breathing and at approximately 8:00 a.m. she thought the
child had stopped breathing (1(3. at page 65, line 18 - page 68,
line 11).

She knew she was to call the doctor if the child's

condition

worsened

(Id.

at

page

51,

line

6

-

20).

Notwithstanding, she failed to timely call Defendant and when she
did and he was not in she failed to identify herself or leave
word of an emergency (1(3. at page 69, lines 2 - 1 3 ; page 71, line
7 - page 72, line 4 and T. Vol. V, page 23, line 17 - page 24,
line 21).

Moreover, she

failed

to seek alternate emergency

medical aid from any other source.
- 9R
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Since the child may have lived had medical attention been
obtained within eleven to twelve hours after birth and since the
delay in obtaining the needed medical care was the fault of
grandmother rather than Defendant, there was clearly insufficient
evidence to convict Defendant of negligent homicide.

The child's

death was not caused by Defendant leaving the child with the
family.

It resulted because the child's grandmother failed to

reasonably

act when

she perceived

the child's

deteriorating

condition.

There is no evidence that Defendant should have foreseen
that Ivy Young would fail to contact him or timely call for
alternate emergency medical care after having perceived that the
child's condition was worsening.

Under the circumstances, th^ evidence was insufficient to
convict

Defendant

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

As

stated

in

Harmon;
. . . only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime . . . (will the
court reverse). (Emphasis added)
99 Utah Adv. Rpt. at page 35.

Such

is the case here.

Defendant

conviction reversed.
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is entitled

to have his

CONCLUSION
The

State

has

failed

to prove

offense of negligent homicide.

Defendant

committed

the

FIRST, it failed to prove the

proper medical standard of care by using expert witnesses of a
different school of medicine than Defendant.

SECOND, it failed

to present evidence regarding the degree of deviation from the
alleged

standard

of

care

and

THIRD, there was

insufficient

evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a causal link
between Defendant's leaving the child at the Young home for
observation immediately
child

approximately

grandmother

following birth and the death of the

thirteen

perceived

its

hours

thereafter.

deteriorating

medical

The

child's

condition.

Nevertheless, she failed to timely or reasonably respond by way
of advising Defendant so he could properly react or by contacting
other

medical

emergency

facilities

so as

to provide

needed

medical care for the child.

Consequently,

Defendant

is entitled

to have

this Court

reverse his conviction rendered in the Qourt below.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

DAR^tU ^C^BANSEN • «
Attorney for Defendant
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